This paper examines optimal fines in a regulatory framework where the regulator can choose either surprise or announced inspections to monitor a firm for compliance. The regulator hires a supervisor who exerts unobservable monitoring effort. The firm receives a fine if the supervisor finds evidence of non-compliance, but it can invest in avoidance. Our Principal-Supervisor-Agent model focuses on the trade-off between the frequency of inspections and the magnitude of the fine. We find that when inspections are unannounced, the optimal fine is maximal, but when they are announced, the optimal fine may be less than maximal.
Introduction
The question regarding whether fines should be maximal has received considerable attention in the law and economics literature. Becker's (1968) early work in this area showed that fines should be maximal when raising the probability of detection is costly. Specifically, his argument is that if violators are risk-neutral, then by lowering the detection probability while raising the fines, a regulator can maintain compliance while lowering costs. Thus, fines will be raised to their maximal level (see also Garoupa 2001 ). Extending Becker's work, Malik (1990) allows for the possibility that the agent can invest in avoidance activities to reduce the probability of detection. That is, the probability of detection is increasing in the regulator's level of monitoring and decreasing in the violator's level of avoidance. He shows that if detection avoidance activities are costly, the optimal fine is not maximal because raising the fine can increase the agent's incentive to hide. Since raising the fine increases the level of costly avoidance, the maximal fine is not optimal.
Malik's key insight is to recognize that raising the fine is not a costless transfer from agent to regulator, because raising the fine increases the equilibrium level and cost of avoidance.
Thus, raising the fine and lowering detection effort is not necessarily a cost-neutral policy maneuver.
Langlais (2008) extends Malik's work to study the effect of the regulator's level of monitoring on the marginal effectiveness of avoidance activities. He focuses on the case where monitoring enhances the marginal effectiveness of avoidance on reducing the probability of detection, a case we refer to as substitutes. He shows that raising the fine while lowering the level of monitoring leads to two opposing effects. First, raising the fine increases avoidance activity and its associated costs, as in Malik (1990) in avoidance activities that reduce the probability of being detected, surprise inspections may be particularly effective because they allow the regulator to catch the agent off-guard.
It is important to recognize that the type of inspection regime will affect the level of avoidance activity chosen by the firm. When the inspection regime is unannounced, then then agent will always have to invest in avoidance in order to hide evidence of its noncompliance. Whereas when inspections are announced, the agent will only need to invest in avoidance when it knows that an inspection is impending. Thus, the equilibrium level of avoidance depends on the inspection regime. Given that Malik (1990) and Langlais's (2008) qualifications to Becker depend on the responsiveness of avoidance to changes in the fine, we believe that the next step is to understand how their results vary according to the type of inspection regime chosen, especially since both announced and unannounced regimes are observed in actual regulatory settings.
A second natural extension of the literature on maximal fines concerns monitoring effort.
The previous literature on optimal fines with avoidance focuses on a first best environment where monitoring effort is fully contractible. Tirole (1986) , and the vast literature that follows it, have studied incentives within an organization where the regulator is a principal who must hire supervisors in order to monitor agents. In such organizations, if supervisors must exert costly monitoring effort and this effort is unobserved, then a moral hazard problem arises (Mookherjee and Png 1995) . Hence the regulator will need to use incentives in order to motivate the supervisor to exert effort. In this second best environment where the level of monitoring is subject to moral hazard, it remains to be seen whether the fine should be maximal.
In order to study these issues we develop a Principal-Supervisor-Agent model of inspection regimes. In our model the principal is a regulator who must hire supervisors in order to inspect the agents, which we take to be firms, and fine the ones that are found incompliant. Given an inspection regime that specifies whether inspections are announced or unannounced, the regulator chooses the frequency of inspections and the fine that a non-compliant firm must pay if it is detected. The supervisor's monitoring intensity is non-contractible, therefore as in Mookherjee and Png (1995) the regulator provides incentives for costly effort by offering a reward for a successful inspection. Taking this regulatory environment as given, the firm and the supervisor then play a simultaneous move game in which the firm chooses its level of avoidance, while the supervisor chooses the level of inspection effort. Following Malik (1990) , the probability of detecting a firm's non-compliance is increasing in inspection effort and decreasing in the firm's level of avoidance activity. However, inspection effort may enhance or reduce the marginal effect of avoidance activity on the probability of detection. 1 The ex-ante probability of fining a firm is the probability of an inspection frequency times the probability of detection. Thus, our model distinguishes the probability of scheduling an inspection from the probability of successful detection, conditional on an inspection being scheduled. In this context we study the welfare maximizing policies available to the regulator 1 Langlais (2008) focuses on the case where monitoring effort enhances the marginal effect of avoidance on the probability of detection and examine whether the fine will be maximal under different regimes.
We find that whether the fine is maximal depends critically on the inspection regime chosen. In an unannounced regime the optimal fine is always maximal even when avoidance is costly. Whereas in an announced regime the optimal fine is not always maximal. In brief, the intuition for this result is as follows. In an unannounced regime the supervisor is fully informed regarding the scheduling of an inspection, while the firm is not. Specifically, the firm knows the probability with which an inspection will be scheduled, but does not know when it will occur. Thus, the risk neutral firm chooses its level of avoidance based on the unconditional expected fine, which is simply the product of the inspection frequency, the probability of detection and the fine. It follows that, from the perspective of the firm's equilibrium choice of avoidance, the frequency of inspections and the fine are substitutes.
An additional implication is that the elasticity of compliance with respect to the fine is always equal to the elasticity of compliance (or avoidance) with respect to the inspection frequency. Consequently, any change in the frequency can always be offset by a changing the fine in a way that leaves the level of compliance constant. However, raising the frequency of inspections increases costly supervisor effort since the supervisor must exert effort more often. In contrast, raising the fine does not have this effect. Since the inspection frequency and the fine have equivalent effects on compliance and avoidance, but raising the fine is less costly, a welfare-maximizing regulator will choose to raise the fine maximally. Interestingly, the above conclusion differs under an announced regime because the firm knows when an inspection will occur. That is, the firm's avoidance decision depends on the expected fine conditional on the occurrence of an inspection. Hence, changing the inspection frequency does not have the same effect on compliance as changing the fine. As a result, Langlais's (2008) proposition that the optimal fine may not be maximal is again satisfied.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and studies the equilibrium behavior of the firm and the supervisor, taking the policy variables chosen by the regulator as given. Section 3 studies the welfare maximizing policies of the regulator, including a brief discussion of the optimal choice between unannounced and announced inspections. Section 4 discusses the robustness of the results to changes in some of the assumptions. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
The model
We consider the model introduced by Dechenaux and Samuel (2013) . In this model a firm (F ) decides whether to comply with regulation or to be non-compliant. The firm receives a benefit g ≥ 0 from non-compliance and the benefit from compliance is normalized to zero. A principal or regulator (P ) hires a supervisor (S) to monitor the firm's activities. The basic structure is identical to Malik (1990) except that we introduce a supervisor and an array of possible inspection regimes. For a firm that is non-compliant, the probability that the supervisor is able to provide verifiable evidence of the firm's violation is given by p(m, x).
The variable m denotes the supervisor's choice of monitoring intensity and the variable x denotes the firm's avoidance effort. The firm's avoidance cost function is C F (x) = x and the supervisor's monitoring cost function is C S (m) = m. We make the following assumptions, which are standard and justified at greater length in Dechenaux and Samuel (2013) . We make no specific assumption on the cross-partial derivative of p(m, x) except for the requirement that it be non-zero for a subset of (m, x) values. In contrast, Malik (1990) 
They are global substitutes if the strict inequality holds for every (m, x). Instead, if the above cross-partial derivative is strictly greater than zero at (m, x), then monitoring intensity and avoidance effort are complements.
We may interpret the case with complements as one where an increase in hiding encourages the supervisor to exert more monitoring effort. In the case with substitutes, an increase in hiding discourages the supervisor from exerting more effort.
Following an inspection, if the firm is not compliant and the supervisor is able to provide verifiable evidence of the violation, the firm must pay a fine f , where f > 0. In this case, the supervisor receives a wage equal to r. If the inspection is unsuccessful, both the fine and the wage are equal to zero.
Inspection regimes
We focus on two alternative inspection regimes, announced (A) and unannounced (U ) inspections, although our model accommodates an array of possible regimes. Formally, with probability σ, the regulator schedules an inspection (I) and with probability 1 − σ, no inspection is scheduled (N I). That is, the true probability of an inspection is σ. The firm then receives a signal θ out of the set {i, ni, ∅}, wherein Pr(θ = i I) = Pr(θ = ni N I) = q and
In regime A, inspections are announced so q = 1. By contrast, in regime U , inspections are unannounced so q = 0. 2 Under an announced regime the firm's posterior belief about an inspection is equal to one when it receives signal i and zero when it receives signal ni. Under an unannounced regime, the firm never receives a signal (i.e., it receives ∅ with probability one) so that its posterior belief is equal to the prior (σ, 1 − σ). Finally, both the inspection regime and the corresponding frequency are common knowledge. Given this structure, the timing of the game is as follows.
0. Given a regime A or U , the regulator announces the frequency of inspections σ, the fine f and the supervisor's reward r.
1. The firm chooses compliance or non-compliance. The supervisor learns whether or not the firm is compliant, but this information is unverifiable.
2a. Suppose the regime is A. Then Nature's draw, I or N I, becomes public information.
Regardless of the draw, if the firm is compliant, then no further decisions are made and all players earn zero. If the firm is non-compliant, then if I was drawn, the supervisor and the firm simultaneously choose m and x, respectively. If N I was drawn, the game ends and the firm's payoff is equal to g, the supervisor earns zero and the regulator earns −h.
2b. Suppose the regime is U . If the firm is compliant, no further decisions are made and all players earn zero. Otherwise, the supervisor learns Nature's draw, I or N I, but the firm does not. The firm chooses x and if I was drawn, the supervisor chooses m. At this stage, the two players' beliefs differ. The supervisor knows the true state of the world, but the firm believes an inspection occurs with probability σ.
3. In the final stage all fines and payments are transferred.
The timing is summarized in Figures 1a and 1b . Under either an announced or an unannounced regime, we refer to the simultaneous game in which the supervisor and a non-compliant firm choose m and x as the inspection subgame. In the next subsection, we establish a series of results pertaining to the inspection subgame. First, we introduce assumptions guaranteeing that the inspection subgame has a unique equilibrium in which the supervisor chooses a strictly positive level of monitoring and the firm a strictly positive level of avoidance. Then we examine how equilibrium behavior responds to changes in the regulator's policy variables.
Nash equilibrium in the inspection subgame
For conciseness, we only provide the background results that are required to conduct the welfare analysis. For details regarding the characterization of the Nash equilibrium, we refer the reader to Dechenaux and Samuel (2013) . We first derive the supervisor's best response and then we analyze the firm's problem. When choosing m, the supervisor knows that an inspection is going to occur. Hence, for given x, the supervisor's choice of m is independent of the inspection regime and the value of σ. Specifically, conditional on an inspection, the supervisor chooses m to maximize his expected payoff
The first order condition at an interior solution is,
We now turn to the firm's behavior, which depends on the value of θ, the signal it has received. First, consider the unannounced regime. In this case the firm never receives a signal. The firm's posterior belief is that an inspection will occur with probability σ and no inspection will occur with probability 1 − σ. The firm chooses x to minimize its expected loss
If σ = 0, then x = 0 is optimal. Also, if m = 0, then x = 0 is optimal. The first order condition at an interior solution to the firm's expected loss minimization problem is
As (1) shows, the frequency σ and the fine f enter the firm's expected loss multiplicatively.
Therefore the firm's best response behavior in avoidance will be the same for every frequency and fine pair (σ, f ) such that σf is constant. While this is the case under an unannounced regime, it does not hold true under an announced regime.
If the regime is announced inspections, the probability of receiving the correct signal is equal to one. If the signal is ni, the firm does not do anything because it knows there will not be an inspection. If the signal is i, the firm knows there will indeed be an inspection.
In this case again, the best response to m = 0 is x = 0. Otherwise, the firm chooses x to minimize
which yields a first order condition that is identical to the above, but with σ = 1. Thus, the firm's optimal avoidance behavior depends on f , but it does not depend on σ. Letting m * (x) denote the supervisor's best response function and x * j (m) the firm's best response function under regime j ∈ {U, A}, we make the following additional assumptions.
Assumption 2
As shown in Dechenaux and Samuel (2013) , the above assumptions are sufficient for the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the inspection game. 3
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold. Then for every σ ∈ (0, 1] and j ∈ {U, A}, the inspection game between the supervisor and a non-compliant firm has a unique Nash equilibrium (m j , x j ) and in equilibrium, x j > 0 and m j > 0.
Proof. See Dechenaux and Samuel (2013) .
Before turning to the welfare maximization problem, we characterize the impact of changes in the policy variables f , r and σ on the equilibrium levels of monitoring and avoidance in the following lemma. In an announced regime, the relationship between m A and x A and the fine f and the supervisor's reward r are identical to the above. However, m A and x A independent of σ.
Proof. See the Appendix. Welfare depends on the level of compliance that results from the regulator's enforcement policy. The firm chooses to be non-compliant if and only if its private gain exceeds the expected loss from being fined. It follows that in an unannounced regime a firm will choose to be non-compliant if and only if
In an announced regime a firm will choose to be non-compliant if and only if
3 Welfare maximizing policies with incorruptible su-
pervisors
We now consider the optimal policy of a social planner who can choose all three policy variables, f , σ and r. A key question here is whether the results in Malik (1990) and Langlais (2008) according to which the fines may not be maximal when hiding occurs still applies to our context.
Note that if any of the policy variable is set to zero, then under both announced and unannounced inspections, no inspection or avoidance effort are exerted and there is no compliance because there are no effective inspections. In this case, the expected level of the private benefit from non-compliance is equal to the mean of the distribution,ĝ ≡ ∫ gmax 0g φ(g)dg. Therefore expected welfare in the absence of any inspection is given byĝ − h. In contrast, the first best welfare level obtains when only those firms with g ≥ g = h are allowed to be non-compliant and welfare is then equal to ∫ gmax hg φ(g)dg − [1 − Φ(h)]h. Below, we implicitly assume that some degree of enforcement is socially efficient so that setting a policy variable equal to zero is not optimal.
Social welfare in unannounced regimes
Following Becker (1968) , Polinsky (1980) and Malik (1990) we assume that all firms, whether compliant or not, possess a wealth level of w > 0, and that this wealth level is known to the principal. A utilitarian social planner or principal chooses (f, r, σ) to maximize the total surplus or social welfare,
The expected welfare function is closest to Langlais (2008) , except for a few notable differences. First, in his model, conditional on non-compliance, the cost of avoidance is borne with probability one, whereas in our model, the probability is σ. Second, recall our assumption that the supervisor observes the firm's compliance level ex-ante. Hence, the supervisor invests m only if the firm is non-compliant and an inspection is scheduled, which has probability σ(1 − Φ(g U )). In Langlais (2008), inspection costs are incurred with probability one. The assumption that the supervisor has non-verifiable information of the firm's compliance level has been used in other models of corruption (Samuel 2009 ). Finally, whereas in Langlais (2008) the level of enforcement effort is specified in reduced-form and is chosen directly as a policy parameter, here the level of monitoring m is endogenously chosen by the supervisor and in equilibrium, it depends on the policy variables f , r, and σ.
To gain insight into the solution to the welfare maximization problem, assume that the 4 Additionally, g U ≤ g max must hold. Below we ignore this constraint, which is equivalent to assuming that g max is sufficiently large (relative to w).
problem admits a solution such that both r and σ are interior. Denoting by λ the Lagrangian multiplier on the fine constraint, the three first order conditions are
and
For simplicity, as in Langlais (2008), assume that m and x are global substitutes. In this case, because m U and x U are both increasing in r, the right-hand side of the second equation is clearly positive. Furthermore, g U is increasing in r as well. Therefore it follows from the first order condition with respect to r that
Similar to Langlais, as compared to the first best, the optimal policy regime may result in first-best compliance (g U = h) over-compliance (g U < h) or under-compliance (g U > h). But the question we wish to focus on is: When is the maximal fine constraint binding?
To address this question, we highlight a key relationship between the effects of σ and f on welfare. Specifically, the following holds ∂σ ≥ 0, which is a necessary condition for σ > 0, and Φ(g U ) < 1, then it must be the case that ∂T S U ∂f > 0. This implies that the fine is maximal.
Proposition 1 Assume that avoidance and inspection effort are global substitutes. If the welfare maximization problem has a solution such that g U < g max , then the fine f is maximal.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above result may seem surprising in light of Malik (1990) and Langlais (2008) who find that whether or not the fine is maximal is generally ambiguous (see also the survey in Sanchirico, 2010). Our result follows from the fact that we separate the probability of an inspection from the probability of detection. In our model with unannounced inspections, the effect on compliance of raising f is proportional to the effect of raising σ. That is,
holds regardless of whether x and m are complements or substitutes. However, the marginal cost of raising σ exceeds that of raising f by a discrete amount, because a small increase in the frequency of inspections entails an additional expenditure equal to m U with each noncompliant firm. Therefore, we obtain a result that is similar to Becker's (1968) classic result.
In the next subsection, we show that announced inspections are different. For announced regimes, the optimal fine is not always maximal.
Social welfare in announced regimes
In this section we show that the announced regime differs from the unannounced regime in substantial ways. As we explain below, this difference arises because the fine and frequency tradeoffs are not comparable between the two regimes.
Under announced inspections, the regulator chooses to maximize
where
At an interior solution in r and σ and allowing for a binding constraint on the fine, the three first order conditions are given by
Again, for simplicity assume that x and m are global substitutes. Note that since m A and x A are both increasing in r, from the first order condition with respect to r it follows that,
Furthermore, ∂g A ∂σ > 0 under the announced regime and m A and x A are independent of σ. Therefore, the left-hand side of the first order condition for σ is always positive and the right-hand side is equal to (1 − Φ(g A ))(m A + x A ). It follows that the relationship between the effects of σ and f on expected welfare is very different under an announced regime than under an unannounced regime. Because m A and x A do not depend on σ, the tradeoff between fine and frequency in equation (2) simply does not apply to the case of announced inspections. Therefore, unlike unannounced inspections, it may be the case that all three policy variables are interior at a solution to welfare maximization. In fact, Proposition 2 below provides a necessary condition for the fine to be maximal when the supervisor's reward and the frequency of inspections are interior.
Proposition 2 Assume that avoidance and inspection effort are global substitutes. If the welfare maximization problem has a solution (f A , r A , σ A ) such that σ A < 1 and g A < g max hold, then for the fine to be maximal, equation (3) below must be satisfied at (f A , r A , σ A )
Finding an intuitive interpretation of equation (3) is difficult. However, the inequality solely depends on p(m, x) and its derivatives. Therefore it suggests that there exist primitive assumptions on p(m, x) under which the condition almost always holds.
Furthermore, under an announced inspection regime, note that compliance is always increasing in σ, while compliance may be increasing or decreasing in f . 5 Letting j i denote the elasticity of i with respect to j, suppose that the following holds
Then compliance is decreasing in f . Since raising f lowers compliance, σ must also be raised to achieve the same level of compliance. But since the expected costs (conditional on non-compliance) are h + σ(x A + m A ) and x A and m A are independent of σ, costs are raised.
Thus, welfare cannot always be improved by raising f and lowering σ, which explains why the optimal fine is not always the maximal fine.
The choice between announced and unannounced inspections
The previous sections examine the optimal policy vector (f, r, σ) for an exogenously chosen regime, given by either announced or unannounced inspections. One of the key questions we have yet to address is the optimal choice between announced and unannounced inspections.
In general, either regime may be optimal depending on the parameters h, w and g max and the primitives p(m, x) and φ(g). Thus, without further functional restrictions and loss of generality it is difficult to answer this question. In lieu of providing a complete analysis, below we show that if the harm h is sufficiently large then unannounced inspections are preferred to announced inspections. We then explain why the sufficient condition provided in the statement of the proposition is very likely to be satisfied when monitoring and avoidance are global substitutes.
Assume that the welfare maximization problem has a unique solution under both announced and unannounced inspections. Then the following result holds. With such a lower bound, we cannot rule out that the solution to welfare maximization is such that σ is set to the lower bound, while both f and r are interior. In this case, the frequency of inspections is too high as compared to the unconstrained optimum. At the optimal vector of policy parameters, ∂T S U ∂σ < 0 holds. Thus equation (2) implies that the following must hold for a non-maximal fine, −
That is, the regulator would like to lower σ further in order to save an amount at the margin equal to the expected inspection cost. However, the regulator is constrained by the lower bound on σ and is thus left with only two free instruments, the fine and the supervisor's reward. Thus, the tradeoff between fine and frequency of inspection that underlies Proposition 1 becomes ineffective and the fine may not be maximal in this case.
Proportional supervisor reward
Our results are based on a formulation of the supervisor's reward where this reward does not depend on f . In contrast, other studies such as Mookherjee and Png (1995) , the reward is proportional to the fine. Suppose then that the supervisor's reward is given by r(f ) = sf , where s > 0. When the regulator employs such a reward function, the tradeoff between fine and frequency in equation (2) is disrupted. In the case of substitutes, the intuition for what this implies is as follows. When the reward is not proportional to the fine, the fine only affects the supervisor's monitoring effort indirectly by shifting the firm's best response function, which lowers the supervisor's effort level. The fine only has a strategic effect on monitoring effort. A change in the frequency of inspections has an identical impact on monitoring effort. However when the reward is proportional to the fine, the fine has an additional, direct effect on the incentives to monitor that the frequency of inspections does not have. Raising the fine increases the size of the reward, which shifts the supervisor's best response function upward.
The conflation of the incentive and strategic effects gives rise to the following partial derivatives in the unannounced regime,
where J > 0. The partial derivatives with respect to σ are identical to those in the case with fixed reward but with r = sf .
Focusing on monitoring effort m U , the strategic effect is clearly negative, but the incentive effect is positive. Hence the incentive effect attenuates the negative strategic effect. Turning to avoidance effort x U , both the incentive and the additional strategic effects are positive.
Thus, with a proportional reward scheme, raising the fine has a positive effect on the costs of avoidance (strategic effect) and monitoring (incentive effect) that raising the frequency of inspections does not have. As a result it is conceivable that the optimal fine is not always the maximal fine in this case.
Conclusion
We build a Principal-Supervisor-Agent model of deterrence and examine the optimal policy choice of the welfare-maximizing principal (or regulator). An inspection policy comprises the frequency of inspections, the supervisor's reward and the fine for violations. As in Dechenaux and Samuel (2013), we incorporate the type of inspection regime chosen, unannounced or announced, and allow for supervisor moral hazard and avoidance activities by the agent (or firm). We show that if the supervisor's monitoring effort and the firm's avoidance are substitutes in the probability of detection, then the regulator's optimal fine is the maximal fine in an unannounced regime. However, the optimal fine may not be maximal under an announced regime. Therefore, sufficient conditions for a maximal fine are that avoidance and monitoring effort are substitutes, as in Langlais (2008) , and the regime chosen is unannounced, surprise inspections.
Our analysis helps to identify characteristics of the inspection technology and procedures under which the optimal fine is maximal. Are these characteristics empirically relevant? As the literature has recognized, avoidance and enforcement (or monitoring) effort cannot be global complements (Malik 1990 ), so that a probability of detection where they are substitutes emerges as the natural case to examine (Langlais 2008 
The Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives for this system of equations is given by
Comparative statics w.r.t. f : Differentiating the two FOC's with respect to f yields the following vector
Applying Cramer's rule, we obtain,
Thus m U is decreasing in f if x and m are substitutes and m U is increasing in f if they are complements. Similarly,
Hence x U is always increasing in f .
Comparative statics w.r.t. r: Differentiating the two FOC's with respect to f yields the following vector
Cramer's rule, we obtain,
Thus m U is increasing in r. Similarly,
Therefore, x U is increasing in r if x and m are substitutes and x U is decreasing in r if they are complements.
Comparative statics w.r.t. σ: Differentiating the two FOC's with respect to σ yields the following vector
Applying Cramer's rule, we obtain
Therefore, m U is decreasing in σ if x and m are substitutes and m U is increasing in σ if they are complements.
Therefore, x U is always increasing σ.
For an announced regime, it is straightforward to show that the expressions for the partial derivatives with respect to r and f are identical to the above. However, neither m A , nor x A depend on σ. Thus, 
Proof of Proposition 1
Assume that the welfare maximization problem has a solution and that the solution satisfies g U < g max . Then at the solution, f > 0, r > 0 and σ > 0, otherwise there is no enforcement or compliance. Furthermore, we do not impose any constraints on r so that existence of a solution implies that the optimal r is interior. Regarding σ, there are two possibilities.
Either σ ∈ (0, 1) or σ = 1.
If σ = 1 at the solution, it must be the case that 
Proof of Proposition 2
There is no upper bound on r. Therefore, if a solution exists, r must be interior. Hence, rearranging the first order condition for r yields
Furthermore, if σ < 1, then the optimal value of this variable is interior as well, so that rearranging the first order condition yields
It thus follows that
Moreover, if the fine is maximal then at f = w,
which is equivalent to λ ≥ 0. 
Proof. Compliance under unannounced inspections is
By the envelope theorem, the derivative of compliance with respect to f is 
Proof of Proposition 3
We complete this proof in two steps. First, we show that for for every (f, r, σ), if g U > g A at that (f, r, σ) and h is sufficiently large, then T S U ≥ T S A at (f, r, σ). It then follows that if g U > g A holds at (f, r, σ) = (f A , r A , σ A ), then for h is sufficiently large, T S U (f A , r A , σ A ) ≥ T S A (f A , r A , σ A ) and thus T S U (f U , r U , σ U ) ≥ T S A (f A , r A , σ A ).
Step 1: Fix (f, r, σ), then On the left-hand side of (A4), the coefficient in front of h is strictly positive if g U > g A .
Moreover, the right-hand side does not depend on the harm h. Thus, for a given (f, r, σ), if g U > g A and h is sufficiently large, then (A4) is satisfied.
